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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS P. HEERMAN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 20030205-CA 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Heerman appeals the district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute his petition for 
post-conviction relief (addendum A). The petition challenged his plea and conviction for one 
count of Attempted Sodomy of a Child, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the district court properly dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief 
for failure to prosecute? 
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies: 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute, 
we accord the trial court broad discretion and do not disturb its decision absent 
an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has occurred. 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
Addendum B - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. 
Addendum C - Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 
through § 78-35a-110 (1996). 
Addendum D - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Petitioner Heerman was charged with two counts of Sodomy of a child (R. 137-39). 
On April 6,1998, he entered an Alford plea to one count of Attempted Sodomy of a Child, 
a first degree felony (R. 143-196). He was sentenced to three years to life at the Utah state 
prison (R. 197-202). Heerman never filed a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct appeal 
of his conviction or sentence. 
On July 1, 1999, Heerman filed a petition for post-conviction relief (R. 1- 17). The 
district Court entered a ruling that summarily dismissed Heerman's first claim2 and directed 
the State to respond to Heerman's second claim, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel 
(R. 18-20) (addendum E). The State filed its response on November 15, 1999 (R. 36-202). 
On June 5, 2000, the Court approved Heerman's request to take depositions from two 
attorneys (R. 254 and 277-81). However, Heerman never took any depositions (R. 610:8). 
1
 Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section of the brief. 
2
 Heerman's first claim alleged that he believed that by entering an Alford plea, he 
would be afforded all benefits associated with having maintained his innocence (R. 4-5). 
2 
On February 14,2002, the Court entered an order to show cause for dismissal. During 
a telephone conference ball on April 22,2002, counsel for Heerman told the court that there 
was "no problem with this case being dismissed as his client will be proceeding in another 
direction." (R. 361 A). Therefore the case was dismissed (R. 361A and 558-562).3 
On July 11, 2002, new counsel, Mitchell Barker, entered a notice of appearance and 
filed amotion to vacate the order of dismissal (R. 393-404). An evidentiary hearing was held 
on October 31, 2002 (R. 518-520 and trans. R. 609). The Court granted the motion to set 
aside the dismissal to which Heerman's prior counsel had agreed (R. 558-562, 609) 
(addendum F). However, the Court found that there still needed to be a decision as to 
whether the matter should be dismissed for failure to prosecute (R. 609:140). 
A hearing on the issue of dismissal for failure to prosecute was held on January 13, 
2003 (R. 580-81 andR. 610:1-135). On February 4,2003, the Court entered a ruling which 
dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute (R. 584-93) (addendum A). On March 5,2003 
Heerman filed his notice of appeal. 
Heerman is no longer in prison. He was paroled on April 8, 2003. 
FACTS FROM THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL CASE 
Heerman entered an Alford plea. At the plea hearing, when the court asked for a 
factual basis, the prosecutor stated: "The evidence from the preliminary hearing and that the 
victim has told in various interviews is that the defendant would essentially come up to him 
3
 On May 15, 2002, Heerman filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 364-65). Because 
the dismissal was later set aside, the appeal was dismissed as moot (R. 606). 
3 
and have him - would - yeah, he'd have the victim, who was at the time of the count he's 
pleading to, let's see his date of birth was '85, so - . . . definitely under the age of 14. But 
anyway, he had the victim drop his pants and he would drop his and he would insert his penis 
into the anus of the little boy. And the boy has said he felt wet afterwards on certain of those 
times. He said this happened many times. So we believe this happened many times over the 
entire period that he was in Fruitland and that it started in Bountiful before he came out to 
Fruitland, the same kind of conduct. 
We have a colposcope which would show damaged anal - anal tear which is 
consistent with - with the testimony of the child. And also the child had a condition of 
encopresis, which is that he's unable to control his bowel movements properly and would 
poop in his pants, and that that we believe - we believe we would have evidence that's 
consistent with abuse." (R. 169-170). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the district court should be affirmed because the petition for post-
conviction relief was properly dismissed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by 
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. A lengthy amount of time elapse in which 
Heerman did nothing to bring his case to conclusion. In fact, Heerman made a conscious 
decision to keep his case on hold while he concentrated on issues before the Board of 
Pardons. Even when told by the post-conviction court that he must proceed, Heerman still 
did nothing to bring his post-conviction case to conclusion. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
The petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed for failure to prosecute.4 "The 
burden is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay.' Plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or 
accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown Const. Co. Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 
P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. I9$7)(citing Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual 
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985) and Dept. ofSoc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 
P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). 
"Cases discussing whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing an action 
for failure to prosecute are fact sensitive." Meadow Fresh Farms Inc., v. Utah State Univ., 
813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore, it is important to closely examine the 
facts when determining whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
case. A review of the facts in this case establishes that petitioner Heerman not only failed 
to prosecute his case with due diligence, but he intentionally chose a course of delay. 
4
 The district court summarily dismissed one of Heerman's claims (R. 18-20) 
(addendum E). Heerman has not alleged on appeal that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing this claim. Heerman has not raised or addressed this issue 
anywhere in his appellate brief. Therefore, the issue of whether the district court properly 
summarily dismissed this claim is waived because it was not raised on appeal. See 
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988 P.2d 1 (issues not briefed by appellant 
are deemed waived and abandoned); Pixton v. State Farm Mutal Auto. Insur. Co. of 
Bloomington, III., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991) (where appellant fails to brief an 
issue, the point is waived). 
5 
The first order to show cause: The petition was filed on July 1,1999 (R. 1-17). The 
State filed its response on November 15, 1999 (R. 36-202). On March 3, 2000, the Court 
sent its first notice of order to show cause for dismissal. On April 21, 2000, Heerman filed 
a motion for discovery (R. 207-216). The show cause hearing on June 5,2000 was changed 
to a hearing on the motion for discovery (R. 253-55). The Court approved Heerman's 
request to take depositions from two attorneys (R. 254 and 277-81). However, Heerman 
never took any depositions (R. 610:8). 
The Stipulation: On September 11, 2000, Heerman filed a stipulation which stated: 
"Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the State of Utah have agreed to suspend future 
proceedings in this case until Mr. Heerman has had an opportunity to have his hearing before 
the Board of Pardons." (R. 258-59) (addendum G).5 The stipulation also stated: "Counsel 
for the parties have no objection to the court passing any appropriate order which suspends 
all future proceedings until Mr. Heerman has had an opportunity to have his case reviewed 
by the Board of Pardons." (R. 248-59) (addendum G). 
5
 The stipulation does not contain any date for Heerman's Board of Pardons 
hearing. At the court hearing on January 13, 2002, counsel for the State told the Court 
that in August of 2000, Mr. Pavlinic, Heerman's out-of-state counsel, called her about 
possibly entering a stipulation. He told her that Mr. Heerman had a showing at the Board 
of Pardons but it was not until April (R. 610:27). Counsel for the State assumed he was 
referring to April of 2001 (R. 610:32-33). Counsel for the State believed she was 
agreeing to stipulate to a continuance of the matter until April of 2001 (R.610:28). The 
Board of Pardons advised counsel that Heerman had a special attention review hearing on 
April 17, 2001 (R. 610:26). 
6 
However, Heerman concedes that "the Stipulation was never presented to Judge Payne 
for approval." (pet's brief, p. 27, n. 16). In its ruling, the Court found that "[t]he Stipulation 
was never approved by the Court." (R. 585). 
Withdrawal of counsel: On August 29, 2000, Kristine Rogers filed a motion to 
withdraw as local counsel (R. 274-276). Pro hac vice counsel, Thomas Pavlinic, was sent 
notice that a hearing on this motion was scheduled for October 10, 2000 (R. 288-290). At 
Mr. Pavlinic's request, the hearing on the motion to withdraw was continued from October 
10,2000 to November 6,2000, and then to December 4,2000 (R. 292-93,298,300,302-03, 
308-09). At the hearing on December 4, 2000, no local counsel appeared and Mr. Pavlinic 
did not appear. Permission for Mr. Pavlinic to act pro hac vice was withdrawn (R. 308-10 
and 313-316). 
On December 19, 2000 counsel for the state filed a NOTICE TO RETAIN COUNSEL OR 
APPEAR IN PERSON (R. 310-312). In a letter dated December 29,2000, Heerman advised the 
court that he was seeking local counsel (R. 317-18). 
The second order to show cause: On May 10, 2001, the court sent notice of a 
hearing for order to show cause for dismissal for lack of prosecution (R. 391-20). A hearing 
on the order to show cause was held on June 18, 2001 (R. 331-32). Heerman appeared in 
person without counsel. Heerman understood that the hearing was to talk about why the case 
shouldn't be dismissed for failure to prosecute (R. 610:98). Heerman explained to the court 
that he understood the State had agreed to put this matter on hold until his hearing before the 
Board of Pardons. He told the court that his hearing would be in April of 2002 (R. 331). 
7 
Heerman testified that he told the court "that there was this agreement between the 
prosecution and my previous counsel to wait until afterwards. And at that time, he [the 
Judge] told me that - that he wasn't going to wait that long." (R. 610:96). The Court told 
Heerman that he needed to get an attorney involved in his case or proceed on his own. The 
court also told Heerman that his case would be dismissed if something had not been filed by 
August 12, 2001 (R. 331-32). Heerman requested a continuance because he told the court 
he was still looking for new counsel (R. 335-341). On September 24, 2001, attorney Greg 
Skordas filed a notice of appearance of counsel (R. 344-45). However, new counsel took no 
action in the post-conviction case except to agree to its dismissal {see letters from counsel, 
R. 523-25). At the evidentiary hearing, the Court asked Heerman some questions about this. 
The following exchange occurred: 
Q. So what was it that you expected Mr. Skordas to do that he wasn't 
doing while this matter was pending? 
A. That was - I contacted Mr. Skordas after you had said you weren't 
going to wait that long when I appeared before here. And I told you that there 
was a - my understanding, that it was going to be postponed until after the 
board hearing. And I believe your words were basically, "I'm not going to 
wait that long." And so I said, "Yes, sir." That was when I started getting to 
work on it, finding another attorney again. And that's when I found Mr. 
Skordas. 





The third order to show cause: Even after being told by the Court that he could not 
rely on the stipulation, Heerman still did nothing. On February 14, 2002, the Court again 
sent notice of an order to show cause for dismissal. A hearing was scheduled for March 11, 
2002 (R. 349-50). During a telephone conference call on March 11, Heerman5 s counsel, Mr. 
Skordas, noted that "Mr. Heerman has a parole hearing the 2nd week of April. If the parole 
hearing goes the way they wish he will dismiss the petition in this case. If not, they don't 
want to have this dismissed." (R. 359). The order to show cause hearing was continued until 
April 22, 2002 (R. 356-57, 359-60). 
Agreed dismissal: During the telephone conference call on April 22, 2002, counsel 
for Heerman6 advised the court that there was "no problem with this case being dismissed 
as his client will be proceeding in another direction." (R. 361 A). Therefore, almost three (3) 
years after the petition was filed, the case was dismissed (R. 361A and 558-562).7 
Motion to Vacate: On July 11,2002, new counsel, Mitchell Barker, entered a notice 
of appearance (R. 393-94). Heerman's new counsel filed a motion to vacate the order of 
dismissal (R. 395-404). An evidentiary hearing was held on October 31,2002 (R. 518-520 
and R. 609:1-150). Following the hearing, the Court granted Heerman's motion to set aside 
the dismissal. (R. 558-562 and 609). In ruling on this issue, the Court stated: "I think he 
made a decision not to oppose the order to show cause. . . . But I cannot say in good 
6
 An associate acting for Mr. Skordas. 
7
 On May 15, 2002, Heerman filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 364-65). Because 
the dismissal was later set aside, the appeal was dismissed as moot (R. 606). 
9 
conscience that he understood the effect of his decision." (R. 609:139-140). The Court said: 
"Pm also convinced, based upon the testimony, that Mr. Skordas never communicated to him 
the effect of a dismissal on the order to show cause." (R. 609:138). Mr. Heerman ccbelieved 
he could refile." (R. 609:139). 
The Court then said: "However, that doesn't answer all the questions. I need to take 
this thing back to where we were on April the 22nd and there needs to be someone come 
before the Court, in this case Mr. Heerman, to show cause why the matter should not be 
dismissed based upon failure to prosecute. And if he cannot do that then the matter will be 
dismissed based upon die merits concerning the issue of failure to prosecute." (R. 609:140). 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute: A hearing on the issue of dismissal for failure 
to prosecute was held on January 13, 2003 (R. 580-81 and R. 610:1-135). Following the 
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. On February 4, 2003, the Court 
entered a ruling which dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute (R. 584-93) (addendum 
A). 
A. Review of the Westinghouse8 factors and the totality of the 
circumstances establishes that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. 
In considering dismissal for failure to prosecute, a court should "seek to balance the 
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with the need to allow 
parties to have their day in court." Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of 
8
 Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975) 
10 
Ag., 813 P.2d 1216,1219 (Utah App. 1991). When consideringwhether dismissal for failure 
to prosecute is appropriate, the district court should consider: 
1. time elapsed since the suit was filed, 
2. the conduct of both parties, 
3. the opportunity each party has had to move the case forward, 
4. what each of the parties has done to move the case forward, 
5. what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side, 
6. most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. UtahDept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212,1215 (Utah 
App. 1993); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept of Ag., 813 P.2d 1216, 
1219 (Utah App. 1991); Maxfield v. Ruston, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989); 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876,879 (Utah 1975). 
When applying the Westinghouse factors, the Utah Supreme Court has required that 
the totality of the circumstances be considered. "A plaintiff cannot isolate and argue facts 
relevant to only one or two of the Westinghouse factors to avoid its burden to prosecute a 
case in due course without unusual or unreasonable delay." Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 
1215 (cites omitted). "In fact, even where a trial court finds facts indicating that 'injustice 
could result from the dismissal of [a] case/ it can dismiss when a plaintiff has 'had more than 
ample opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply failed to do so.5" Id. at 1216. 
The district court properly considered and analyzed each of the Westinghouse factors 
and all of the relevant facts and circumstances of this case (R. 584-593) (addendum A). 
Time elapsed since the suit was filed: The petition for post-conviction relief was 
filed on July 1, 1999. The petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute on February 4, 
11 
2003, over three and a half (3 VT) years later. In its order of dismissal, the district court noted 
that: "Other than requesting that certain people be deposed (which Motion was filed on April 
21, 2000), there is absolutely no record that anything has been done to bring this case to a 
conclusion. Although depositions were authorized, none were taken. Other than the request 
to depose certain witnesses, no discovery has been requested, no motions relevant to the 
claims in the petition have been filed, no request for hearing on any issues has been made, 
nor has a trial been requested. Nothing has been done to bring this case to a conclusion." (R. 
588-89) (addendum A). 
An order allowing Heerman to take depositions was entered on June 5, 2000. 
However, from June 5, 2000 until the case was dismissed, no depositions were ever taken. 
Heerman argues that the stipulation signed by the parties should have stayed the case 
and prevented dismissal for failure to prosecute. As addressed below, the stipulation was 
never approved by the court. In addition, at the hearing on June 18,2001, Heerman was told 
that the court was not going to follow the stipulation. Heerman knew that he could not wait 
until after his parole hearing to proceed with his post-conviction case. Yet from June 18, 
2001 until the case was dismissed, Heerman still did nothing to bring his post-conviction case 
to conclusion. 
The conduct of both parties: Although the Westinghouse decision requires the 
district court to consider the conduct of both parties, "the duty to prosecute is a duty of due 
diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant." Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216, 
citing Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1218. The State timely filed a response to the 
12 
petition (R. 36-202). It therefore timely fulfilled the only duty imposed upon it under the 
controlling rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. The burden was on Heerman to prosecute his 
claims with due diligence. Charlie Brown, 740 P.2d at 1370. 
In its order of dismissal, the district court noted that "[e]arly on in this case Mr. 
Herrman9 [sic] made a conscious decision to keep this case on hold while he concentrated 
on issues before the Board of Pardons." (R. 589) (addendum A). 
The district court specifically found that "[t]he Stipulation to suspend was initiated 
by the Petitioner. It was the Petitioner who proposed that the matter be suspended and this 
was obviously in furtherance of his tactic to delay this case while he addressed issues before 
the Board of Pardons." (R. 589). 
The State agreed to the stipulation.10 However, Heerman acknowledges that "the 
Stipulation was never presented to Judge Payne for approval." (pet's brief, p. 27, n. 16). 
In addition, Heerman testified under oath that at the hearing on June 18, 2001, when he 
mentioned the stipulation, the Judge told him that he would not wait that long. (R. 610:96). 
As the court told coimsel during the hearing: "You can't argue that you relied upon it [the 
stipulation] after June 18th [2001] it turned out that he was notified on June 18*, that that 
wasn't going to happen, it wasn't going to be a stipulation." (R. 610:119). As the district 
court concluded in its ruling: "The Court never approved the Stipulation" (R. 591). 
9
 The Court's ruling prints petitioner's name as "Herrman" instead of "Heerman." 
10
 Although the State believed it was only agreeing to a stipulation to stay the case 
until April of 2001. See footnote 4 above. 
13 
The opportunity each party has had to move the case forward: Heerman had 
several years to move this case forward. As the plaintiff, he had the duty to prosecute his 
case with due diligence. Charlie Brown, 740 P.2d at 1370. Heerman was aware that several 
orders to show cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute were issued before the case was 
actually dismissed, yet he still did nothing to bring his post-conviction case to conclusion. 
The State had fulfilled its obligations by filing a response to the petition, and by 
responding to Heerman's discovery request. The State had no duty or responsibility to move 
petitioner's action to judgment. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 698, n. 2 
(Utah App. 1995). And, since the court had already issued several orders to show cause for 
failure to prosecute, there was not really anything further the State could have done to move 
the case forward. 
What each of the parties has done to move the case forward: Heerman filed the 
petition. The State timely filed its response, and filed a response to Heerman's discovery 
request (R. 219-229). After his discovery request, Heerman did nothing to move his case 
forward. As the district court noted in its ruling: "Petitioner's own counsel, Ms. Rogers, was 
concerned that the case was not progressing. Indeed in her motion to withdraw, which is 
dated August 25, 2000, she states: 'Since 1999 nothing of substance has happened in this 
case.'" (R. 590). 
The district court found that "[t]he State has also not taken any significant action to 
bring the matter to a conclusion." (R. 590). However, "[t]he State's responsibility, as a 
defendant which has not asserted a claim for affirmative relief, is limited." Hartford Leasing 
14 
Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah app. 1995). As this Court said: 
We pause to note the obvious: What each party has done to move the 
case forward can only be evaluated in light of each party's responsibility 
concerning the case. Of course, the plaintiff, as the party initiating the lawsuit, 
has the primary responsibility to move the case forward. The defendant's 
responsibility is limited to responding timely to the action, expeditiously 
attending to discovery, and moving any counterclaim along. The defendant 
has no general responsibility to move plaintiff*'s action to judgment. 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 698, n. 2 (Utah App. 1995). 
When Heerman's local counsel withdrew, and pro hac vice status of his out-of-state 
counsel was withdrawn, the state timely informed Heerman that he must retain new counsel 
or proceed on his own (R. 310-312). When Heerman still did nothing to move his case 
forward, the State could have sought orders to show cause for dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, but that was not necessary, since the court itself issued three orders to show cause. 
What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side: In its ruling, 
the district court found that there was "no direct evidence before the Court as to prejudice 
which has resulted by the delay of this case." (R. 590). However, lengthy delay in any post-
conviction case can seriously prejudice the State. As the district court noted in its ruling: "If 
the State is required to again criminally prosecute the Petitioner they would be required to 
proceed through a child witness who would be required to testify about events which are far 
removed." (R. 591). 
The crime occurred in 1997 (R. 61). Heerman entered his plea in 1998. The petition 
for post-conviction relief was dismissed on February 4, 2003. Delay in the post-conviction 
case could prejudice the State in two ways. First, if the district court determined that an 
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evidentiary hearing was necessary in the post-conviction case, it would involve testimony 
about events that occurred many years ago. Second, if the petition for post-conviction relief 
had been granted, the State would have the option to re-try Heerman. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3 5a-108. Attempting to take a case to trial many years after the crime was committed 
may cause difficulties due to the fact that memories fade, people move and become difficult 
or impossible to locate, or even die. 
In addition, society has a strong interest in finality. '" Justice demands that a convicted 
defendant have an opportunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once the appellate process has 
concluded, society's interest in the effectiveness and integrity of the criminal justice system 
requires a finality of judgment. . . '" Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 320-21 (Utah 1992) 
{quoting Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). Allowing a post-conviction 
case to languish indefinitely with no resolution of the case undermines society's interest in 
finality. 
Whether injustice may result: Petitioner has failed to establish that any injustice 
would result from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition for failure to prosecute.11 The 
11
 In response to the petition for post-conviction relief, the State argued that 
Heerman was procedurally barred from proceeding with the allegations because all of the 
issues raised in his post-conviction petition could have been raised on appeal (R. 39-42). 
In addition, the State argued that Heerman was not entitled to post-conviction relief 
because his voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of all pre-plea non-jurisdictional 
defects (R. 42- 45). Finally, the State argued that even if his claims were not procedurally 
barred, he had failed to meet his burden of proof to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel (R. 45-58). Heerman has failed to refute any of these arguments to establish that 
an injustice would occur if the dismissal for failure to prosecute is affirmed. 
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district court specifically found that Heerman made a conscious decision to keep his post-
conviction case on hold while he concentrated on issues before the Board of Pardons. 
"Instead of responding to the three Order to Show Cause hearings by proceeding on this case, 
he has successfully delayed this case. He has been successful in delaying this case until after 
the Board considered his parole.12 After all of this time he now expects to avoid the 
consequences of his decisions." (R. 592). 
In considering this issue, the district court recognized the importance of the writ of 
habeas corpus. However, the court also noted that it could "not ignore the fact that society 
has a legitimate interest in having such matters timely concluded." (R. 590). The district 
court found that: 
In the second Order to Show Cause hearing on June 18,2001, the Court 
specifically directed the Petitioner to go forward with this case. In spite of this 
direction, nothing was done to further the case. When the matter was 
considered at the third Order to Show Cause hearing (April 22,2002), nothing 
had been done. By the time the third Order to Show Cause hearing was held, 
the matter had been pending for almost three years. Other than difficulties 
experienced in obtaining counsel, the Petitioner has offered no explanation or 
excuse as to why he did not prosecute his case. 
(R. 591). 
"[WJhere a trial court finds facts indicating that 'injustice could result from the 
dismissal of [a] case,' it can dismiss when a plaintiff has 'had more than ample opportunity 
to prove his asserted interest and simply failed to do so.'" Id. at 1216. Heerman had more 
12
 Heerman's hearing before the Board of Pardons was on May 14, 2002. His 
petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed for failure to prosecute on February 4, 
2003. 
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than ample opportunity to proceed with his post-conviction case, but failed to do so. In 
addition, Heerman cannot establish that any injustice would occur if dismissal of his case is 
upheld. The only consequence Heerman would suffer is that he would not be allowed to 
proceed with his post-conviction claims. However, this consequence is not unjust, since it 
occurred due to Heerman's own decision to delay and to not proceed with his post-conviction 
case until after his Board of Pardons hearing, even though the post-conviction court had 
specifically told him that it would not wait that long. 
The district court considered the facts and circumstances of this case and each of the 
Westinghouse factors and properly dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute. 
B. The district court properly excluded several of Heerman's 
proposed exhibits. 
Heerman attempted to admit numerous letters as exhibits at the hearing on January 13, 
2003. Heerman argues that several of his proposed exhibits were rejected in error. Hearsay 
objections were made to proposed exhibits 2, 3, 5 - 14, and 16.13 (R. 610:47, 50-51, 55, 62-
63,65,67-69,76-77). Exhibits 2,3 and 5 were admitted for limited purposes (R. 610:49,51, 
61). Exhibits 6-14 and 16 were not admitted. Under the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
UtahR. Evid. 801(c)(2003). 
13
 Some of the exhibits were also objected to on the basis of lack of foundation or 
relevance (R. 610:63, 65, 67, 69, 76-77). 
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Heerman argues that the excluded exhibits were not hearsay since they were "not 
assertions, and not offered to prove the truth" (pet's brief, p. 39.) However, Heerman goes 
on to state that the exhibits were "offered to show the efforts Mr. Heerman and his 
representative made to keep the case moving, and to keep the court informed of those efforts" 
(pet's brief, p. 39). Therefore, the exhibits were clearly out-of-court statements offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Heerman argues that "[wjhen an out of court statement is offered simply to prove that 
it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the 
hearsay rules." (pet's brief, p. 39). The State agrees that "[wjhen an out-of-court statement 
is offered only to prove that the statement was made, without regard to its truth or falsity, it 
is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982). 
However, Heerman's proposed exhibits were offered to prove what had been done in 
the post-conviction case. The exhibits were worthless without a detemiination as to whether 
the statements in the exhibits were true. The people who made the statements were not 
present at the evidentiary hearing to testify and be cross examined. Without being able to 
cross-examine the person who made the statements, the State had no way to establish 
whether the statements were true - whether the things discussed in the exhibits were actually 
done. They were hearsay because they were out-of-court statements offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted: that something had been done to move the post-conviction case 
toward conclusion. They were properly excluded as hearsay. 
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Heerman argues that some of the proposed exhibits were letters written to the court 
and found in the court's own file, therefore they should have been admitted. However, the 
fact that a letter was written to the court does not establish the truthftilness of the statements 
in the letter. As the court advised counsel during the hearing: 
Well, you don't get evidence in by writing something to the court. I mean, that 
doesn't just bypass all the rules. 
* # * 
I really don't think that you just get around all these hearsay objections by 
saying, "Gee, Judge, it's right in your court file so, therefore, it must be true 
that Mr. Heerman did this and Mr. - his sister did that, and that the attorney 
contacted Mr. Bradshaw and that Mr. Bradshaw contacted Mrs. Rogers, and 
all those things happened. That is rank hearsay. And I just don't think that 
you can get around all those things. 
* * * 
Pmtelling you that the Rules of Evidence apply to this. And you just don't get 
by the Rules of Evidence by saying, "But, Your Honor, it's in the Court's file." 
Because all it is is a letter from the attorney. And if you're presenting this to 
show that the attorney did certain things, that isn't enough to get around a 
hearsay objection. 
(R. 610:56,59,61). 
In his brief, Heerman states: "If they were hearsay, then there would be an applicable 
exception." (pet's brief, p. 40). However, Heerman fails to present any argument or 
authority as to why or how these proposed exhibits would fall under a hearsay exception. 
C. The Court properly considered the entire record before making its 
decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute, 
Heerman argues that the trial court improperly considered statements made at the 
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hearing on June 18, 2001. However, he presents no argument or authority as to why the 
court should not have considered statements made at this hearing before dismissing the case 
for failure to prosecute. Heerman's only argument seems to be that because the court refused 
to admit some of his proposed exhibits, it should not have considered statements made at the 
earlier hearing. This argument has no merit. In fact, Heerman acknowledges that he "is not 
complaining that this was necessarily an error; but it is quite inconsistent and unfair" (pet's 
brief, p. 41). If the district court's action was not error, then there is no basis for this court 
to consider the matter. 
D. The lack of a complete transcript does not establish any basis for 
reversal. 
Heerman argues that the lack of a complete transcript is a reason for reversal and 
remand. The transcript of the January 13, 2003 hearing ends at 7:10 p.m. in the middle of 
a statement from Mr. Barker (R. 610:134). However, a review of the transcript makes it 
obvious that the transcript ends very near the conclusion of the hearing. As Heerman 
acknowledges in his brief, "the bulk of the hearing was preserved" (pet's brief, p. 43). 
The State does not know why the transcript appears to end prematurely. However, 
it is Heerman's duty to provide a transcript of all evidence regarding challenged findings or 
conclusions. "Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
The rule gives appellant guidance on what to do if a transcript is unavailable. If a 
transcript of the end of the hearing is not available; 
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the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, wrho may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted in the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(g). Heerman did not follow this rule. He should be prohibited from 
arguing that he is entitled to relief on appeal because the transcript is incomplete when he did 
not fulfil his obligation to assure a complete record on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for failure to 
prosecute. This Court should affirm the district court's ruling dismissing the petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &_ day of April, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
THOMAS P. HERRMAN, : RULING AND ORDER 
FILED 
Petitioner • DISTRICT COURT 
reuuuuei, .
 D U E S N E C 0 U N T Y i UTAH 
vs. : FEB k 2003 
NNE Met JOA cKEE, CLERK 
STATE OF UTAH, : Case No.: 9908000M pL nrPiiTY 
Respondent. 
Based upon a review of the Court's file, the December 31, 2002 hearing, and the 
January 13, 2003 hearing, the Court finds as follows: 
1. On July 1, 1999 Petitioner filed his "Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act". Kris tine Rogers filed the foregoing pleading as counsel for Petitioner. 
2. On July 22, 1999 Kristine Rogers filed a Motion to Admit Thomas A. Pavlinic as 
co-counsel, Pro Hac Vice. 
3. On August 2, 1999 the Court entered an Order admitting Mr. Pavlinic as co-
counsel, Pro Hac Vice. 
4. On November 15, 1999 Respondent filed its "Response to Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief". 
5. Based upon the lack of activity in the file, the Court set this matter for an Order to 
Show Cause as to why the Petition should not be dismissed and a hearing was scheduled for 
the Order to Show Cause on March 3, 2000 and rescheduled for June 5, 2000. 
6. On April 21, 2000 Petitioner filed a "Rule 65 C(l) Motion and Memorandum for 
Discovery in Support of Request for Leave to Conduct Discovery". This Motion specifically 
requested leave to depose the two trial attorneys and seven fact witnesses. (The fact witnesses 
purportedly possessed evidence as to the Petitioner's guilt or innocence.) 
7. At the June 5, 2000 hearing Mr. Pavlinic indicated that Petitioner wished to depose 
nine people. The State objected and the Court approved deposition of the two attorneys who 
represented the Petitioner in the criminal matter. The Court indicated that after the initial 
depositions had been completed the Petitioner could bring the issue of additional depositions 
back to the Court. The Court also directed that the parties file a Discovery Plan under the 
recent amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure. No Discovery Plan has been submitted or 
approved by the Court. The Court did not grant the Order to Show Cause and the case 
continued. Petitioner was present at this hearing. 
8. On August 29, 2000 the Court received a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel from Ms. 
Kristine Rogers. This Motion indicated that it was based upon Mr. Pavlinic's failure to 
communicate with Ms. Rogers and his failure to take any action in the case. A copy of the 
Motion was sent to Mr. Herrman. 
9. On September 7, 2000 the Court received a "Joint Stipulation Suspending Future 
Proceedings". The parties agreed to ". . . .suspend future proceedings in this case until Mr. 
Herrman has had an opportunity to have his hearing before the Board of Pardons." The 
Stipulation indicated that the parties had no objection to the Court issuing an Order based upon 
the Stipulation; however, no such Order was requested or signed. The Stipulation was never 
approved by the Court. 
10. In response to Miss Rogers Motion to Withdraw, on September 6, 2000 the Court 
instructed the clerk to notify Mr. Pavlinic that he would have to associate with local counsel. 
11. On September 8, 2000 the clerk sent Mr. Pavlinic notice to associate with local 
counsel or be present in Court on October 10, 2000. 
12. On September 29, 2000 the Court received a letter via fax from Mr. Provlinic 
which indicated that he was in the process of obtaining local counsel and requesting 30 days to 
do so. 
13. In response to Mr. Pavlinic's request, the October 10, 2000 hearing was continued 
to November 6, 2000. 
14. On November 2, 2000 the Court received a faxed letter from Mr. Pavlinic which 
indicated that he had an attorney "lined up" and requested a continuance of the November 6, 
2000 hearing. 
15. In response to Mr. Pavlinic's letter, the Court continued the November 6, 2000 
hearing to December 4, 2000. 
16. As of December 4, 2000 local counsel had not made an appearance, and Mr. 
Pavlinic did not appear at the December 4, 2000 hearing. The Court ruled that the Order 
allowing Mr. Pavlinic to appear as counsel should be revoked. 
17. On December 19, 2000 the State filed its Notice to Retain Counsel or Appear in 
Person. A copy of the pleading was served upon Mr. Herrman. 
18. On January 16, 2001 the Court entered its Order granting Miss Rogers' Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel and revoking Mr. Pavlinic's admission Pro Hac Vice. 
19. On January 29, 2001 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated 
December 29, 2000 indicating that he was seeking "local counsel" and that he would represent 
himself until local counsel was obtained. In this letter, Mr. Herrman indicated that he 
understood that the case had been "postponed" until after he saw the Parole Board. Therefore, 
Mr. Herrman was proceeding Pro se from that point until Mr. Skordas entered his 
appearance. 
20. Based upon the lack of activity in the file, the Court set this matter for a second 
Order to Show Cause as to why the Petition should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution 
and a hearing was scheduled for the Order to Show Cause on June 4, 2001. Mr. Herrman, 
who was then acting as his own counsel, was notified of this hearing. 
21. On June 1, 2001 the Court entered a minute entry which indicated that the June 4, 
2001 Order to Show Cause hearing would be continued until June 18, 2001 because Mr. 
Herrman was housed in San Juan County and could not be transported to Duchesne County 
for the June 4, 2001 hearing. 
22. On June 18, 2001 Mr. Herrman appeared before the Court on the Order to Show 
Cause hearing. The Court has reviewed the tape of this hearing. At the hearing the Court 
informed Mr. Herrman that the issue before the Court was whether the case should be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court informed Mr. Herrman that under normal 
circumstances where there was no activity in a case for this period of time, the matter would 
be dismissed. Mr. Herrman indicated that it was his understanding that the case had been 
placed on hold until he appeared before the Board of Pardons. He indicated that it was very 
expensive to pursue both this case and the issues before the Board of Pardons and that he was 
pursuing the matter before the Board at that time. Mr. Herrman indicated that if it did not 
work before the Board, he would get another attorney to work on this case. The Court 
indicated the matter would be dismissed if something was not filed by August 13, 2001. A 
review of the recording convinces the Court Mr. Herrman was on notice that the Court would 
not allow the case to remain dormant until he appeared before the Board of Pardons. He was 
also on notice that the Court expected him to move forward with the process of bringing the 
case to a conclusion. Mr. Herrman was also aware of his obligation to proceed on the matter 
before August 13, 2001. 
23. On July 27, 2001 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated July 18, 
2001 asking for "an additional continuance of 30 days." Mr. Herrman indicated "Information 
has come to my attention that may make it advisable for me to ask for a voluntary dismissal of 
my case." He indicated that he may request that he be allowed to amend his Petition. Mr. 
Herrman indicated that he had been transferred to the Gunnison facility and was having 
problems with his mail and obtaining access to a telephone. 
24. On August 13, 2001 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated August 
8, 2001 detailing problems he was having locating counsel and problems that he was having 
receiving mail and making telephone calls. He requested that he receive a 30 day continuance 
from the time that he received copies of the pleadings. He indicated that if he did not receive 
the continuance he wished to voluntarily dismiss the Petition without prejudice. 
25. On August 15, 2001 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated August 
10, 2001. Mr. Herrman again indicated that he was having problems locating an attorney. 
26. On August 30, 2001 the Court entered a minute entry granting Mr. Herrman a 
continuance for 60 days from that date to obtain new counsel. The Court clerk also wrote a 
note in the minute entry indicating that a copy of the docket was enclosed so that Mr. Herrman 
could determine which documents he needed. Mr. Herrman was also informed that there was 
a cost of 25 cents a page to copy material in the file. 
27. On September 11, 2001 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated 
September 10, 2001 which designated certain pleadings and hearings and asked for the cost to 
obtain copies of those documents. 
28. On September 25, 2001 Mr. Skordas entered his appearance as counsel for Mr. 
Herrman. 
29. On October 21, 2002 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated October 
9, 2001 in which he requested certain court records. Mr. Herrman sent $44 to cover the costs 
of copying. 
30. On February 4, 2002, based upon the lack of activity in the file, the Court set this 
matter for a third Order to Show Cause as to why the Petition should not be dismissed and a 
hearing was scheduled for the Order to Show Cause on March 11, 2002. The notice indicated 
that there had been no activity on this case since the attorney for Petitioner filed his 
Appearance on September 25, 2001. The court had previously ordered Mr. Herrman to file 
some pleading by August 13, 2001. Other than the Notice of Appearance from Mr. Skordas; 
nothing had been filed since Mr. Herrman had been instructed to go forward with the case at 
the June 18, 2001 Order to Show Cause hearing. Notice of the March 11, 2002 hearing was 
sent to Mr. Herrman and Mr. Skordas. 
31. On March 8, 2002 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman dated March 2, 
2002 which requested a copy of the docket. 
32. At the request of the parties, the Court conducted the March 11, 2002 Order to 
Show Cause via telephone. The minute entry indicated that Mr. Skordas informed the Court 
that Mr. Herrman had a parole hearing in the second week of April. If the parole hearing 
went his way, Mr. Herrman would dismiss his Petition. If the hearing did not go his way, 
Mr. Herrman wished to proceed. The Court continued the matter to April 22, 2002 and set 
the matter for a conference call. The Court indicated that the matter would be dismissed if 
Mr. Skordas did not contact the Court on April 22, 2002. Because the hearing was conducted 
via telephonic conference, Mr. Herman did not attend the hearing. The record does not 
indicate whether Mr. Herrman had waived his appearance. A copy of the minute entry for 
the March 11, 2002 hearing was sent to Mr. Herrman. 
33. On April 22, 2002 the Court conducted a telephonic hearing of the Order to Show 
Cause. An associate of Mr. Skordas informed the Court that Mr. Herman had no problem 
with a dismissal of the Petition and that Mr. Herrman intended to proceed in anotiier direction. 
The Court ordered the matter dismissed for lack of prosecution. Mr. Herrman had informed 
Mr. Skordas that he did not wish to be transported to the Court for the hearing on April 22, 
2002. A copy of the minute entry was sent to Mr. Herrman. 
34. On May 13, 2002 the Court received a letter from Mr. Herrman which was dated 
May 8, 2002 and was addressed to Mr. Skordas. Mr. Herrman indicated that he understood 
that a case dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be raised again and instructed Mr. 
Skordas to file a Notice of Appeal. 
35. On May 15, 2002 the Court received a pro se Notice of Appeal from Mr. 
Herrman. 
36. On July 11, 2002 the Court received the following pleadings from Mr. Barker: 
A. Appearance of Counsel 
B. Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal 
C. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal 
37. On July 17, 2002 the State filed its Response to the Motion to Vacate Order of 
Dismissal. 
38. On August 8, 2002 the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to 
Vacate for October 31, 2002. 
39. On October 31, 2002 the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to 
Vacate. The Court granted the Motion to Vacate and rescheduled the Order to Show Cause 
which had been set on April 22, 2002. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause was set for 
January 13, 2003. 
40. On December 19, 2002 the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order Vacating Dismissal. 
41. On January 13, 2003 the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. At that 
hearing the parties stipulated that the Court consider the evidence presented at the October 31, 
2002 hearing. 
42. Other than requesting that certain people be deposed (which Motion was filed on 
April 21, 2000), there is absolutely no record that anything has been done to bring this case to 
a conclusion. Although depositions were authorized, none were taken. Other than the request 
to depose certain witnesses, no discovery has been requested, no motions relevant to the 
claims in the Petition have been filed, no request for hearing on any issues has been made, nor 
has a trial been requested. Nothing has been done to bring this case to a conclusion. 
43. As the Court indicated in its findings from the bench at the conclusion of the 
October 31, 2002 hearing, the testimony of Mr. Herrman was not credible. His testimony at 
the January 13, 2003 hearing was also not credible. Therefore, the Court will find: 
A. Prior to the April 22, 2002 hearing, Mr. Skordas and Mr. Herrman 
specifically discussed the issue of whether to object to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
B. Mr. Herrman specifically authorized that Mr. Skordas consent to dismissal. 
C. Mr. Herrman's motive in not objecting to the April 22, 2002 dismissal was 
that he believed that the existence of this case would have an adverse effect at his hearing 
before the Board of Pardons; and he expressed this concern to his attorney, (Mr. Skordas). 
D. Mr. Skordas was hired for the limited purpose of keeping the case from 
being dismissed at the Order to Show Cause hearings. He was never given the responsibility 
to bring the case to a conclusion through litigation of the issues which had been raised in the 
Petition. 
E. Prior to April 22, 2002, Mr. Herrman had specific knowledge about the 
process of voluntary dismissal as is evident in his letters of July 27, 2001 and August 13, 
2001. 
F. Even after Mr. Pavlinic's ability to represent Mr. Herrman in the case was 
withdrawn, Mr. Pavlmic continued to communicate with Mr. Herrman concerning this case. 
G. Early on in this case Mr. Herrman made a conscious decision to keep this 
case on hold while he concentrated on issues before the Board of Pardons. This intent is 
evident in the fact that: 
1. No discovery or other attempts to bring the case to a conclusion were 
attempted from the time that the matter was filed on July 1, 2000 until the stipulation to 
suspend was filed on September 7, 2000, a period of more than 14 months. 
2. The Stipulation to suspend was initiated by the Petitioner. It was the 
Petitioner who proposed that the matter be suspended and this was obviously in furtherance of 
his tactic to delay this case while he addressed issues before the Board of Pardons. 
3. On June 18, 2001, Mr. Herrman specifically informed the Court that 
he had decided to concentrate on the matters before the Board and wished to have this case put 
on hold until the Board entered its decision. 
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4. On June 18, 2001, Mr. Herrman was specifically instructed that the 
Court would not allow the case to await the Board's hearing in April, 2002. The court 
instructed Mr. Herrman to proceed witii this case. In spite of this, nothing has been done to 
bring this case to a conclusion. 
44. Mr. Herrman appeared before the Board of Pardons for his parole hearing on May 
14, 2002. 
45. Mr. Herrman's incarceration interfered with his ability to obtain substitute counsel 
during the period from June 18, 2001 to September 25, 2001 when Mr. Skordas made his 
appearance. Although his incarceration placed certain limitations on his ability to consult with 
counsel at other times, there was never any limitation on his ability to communicate in writing. 
Neither was there any significant impairment on his ability to speak with counsel. Mr. 
Herrman spoke with Mr. Pavlinic about every week. He spoke with Ms. Rogers two to three 
times a month. He spoke to Mr. Skordas at least five times. He spoke with his sister, who 
was assisting him in these matters, weekly. (His sister sometimes communicated with counsel 
on Mr. Herrman's behalf). Other than the time from June 18, 2001 through September 25, 
2001, his incarceration did not interfere in any significant manner with his ability to 
communicate with counsel. 
46. Petitioner's own counsel, Ms. Rogers, was concerned that the case was not 
progressing. Indeed in her Motion to Withdraw, which is dated August 25, 2000, she states: 
"Since 1999 nothing of substance has happened in this case." 
47. The State has also not taken any significant action to bring the matter to a 
conclusion. 
48. There is no direct evidence before the Court as to prejudice which has resulted by 
the delay of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes: 
1. The critical issue in this matters is whether an injustice will result if the matter is 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. In considering this issues the Court will consider the 
totality of circumstances. The Court is mindful of the importance of the Writ under which this 
case was brought. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is often a defendant's only available tool to set 
aside an unjust or incorrect verdict or judgment. Nevertheless, the Court can not ignore the 
fact that society has a legitimate interest in having such matters timely concluded. The facts in 
this case adequately demonstrate the interest which society has in requiring such cases to be 
concluded within a reasonable amount of time. Mr. Herrman was convicted by his plea of the 
offense of Attempted Sodomy of a Child. The Affidavit which is attached to the Petition 
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indicates that the crime occurred in the Spring of 1997. (See State v. Herrman 971800043). 
The victim was 11 years old when the offense occurred. If the State is required to again 
criminally prosecute the Petitioner they would be required to proceed through a child witness 
who would be required to testify about events which are far removed. Therefore, society as 
well as the Petitioner each have import interests which the Court should consider. 
2. The Court is concerned that it has been the conscious decision of the Petitioner to 
delay this case. Prior to the September 5, 2000 Stipulation, there was no possible excuse for 
the Petitioner's failure to prosecute the matter. Even after the Court's first Order to Show 
Cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, which was held on 
March 5, 2000, the Petitioner made no effort to engage in the business of bringing the case to 
a conclusion. 
3. The Petitioner argues that the Court should not consider the time from September 5, 
2001, when the Stipulation to suspend the proceeding was filed, until June 18, 2001, when 
Mr. Herrman was informed that the Court would not await the Board hearing. Upon 
reflection, the Court has determined that this period of time should be considered but that the 
Court should also consider that the State agreed to a suspension of the proceedings during that 
period of time. The Court's reason for considering this time period are two: (1) The Court 
never approved the Stipulation; and more importantly (2) The Stipulation was initiated by the 
Petitioner as part of his tactic to dely this case. Undue delay is the very basis for the Order to 
Show Cause. It is the Court's judgment that in considering whether the matter should be 
allowed to go forward the Court should consider the fact that the case has been delayed as the 
result of the Petitioner's conscious decision to delay the case as is evident through the fact that 
he initiated the stay. Again, the Court must also consider the fact that the State agreed to the 
continuance. 
4. In the second Order to Show Cause hearing on June 18, 2001, the Court specifically 
directed the Petitioner to go forward with this case. In spite of this direction, nothing was 
done to further the case. When the matter was considered at the third Order to Show Cause 
hearing (April 22, 2002), nothing had been done. By the time the third Order to Show Cause 
hearing was held, the matter had been pending for almost three years. Other than difficulties 
experienced in obtaining counsel, the Petitioner has offered no explanation or excuse as to why 
he did not prosecute his case. 
5. With respect to counsel, although it is true between June 18, 2001 (when Petitioner 
began his search for new counsel) and September 25, 2001 (when Mr. Skordas entered his 
appearance), the Petitioner did have difficulty obtaining counsel. This, however, ignores the 
fact that from July 1, 1999 (when the case was filed) to January 15, 2001 (when Ms. Rogers 
withdrew) the Petitioner had counsel. He also had counsel from September 25, 2001 (when 
Mr. Skordas entered his appearance) until April 22, 2002 (when the third Order to Show 
Cause was scheduled). Mr. Herrman also specifically indicated in his December 29, 2000 
letter that he was representing himself until he obtained counsel. Mr. Herrman was aware that 
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Ms. Rogers was seeking to withdraw as counsel and that the Court had held a hearing on 
December 4, 2000 where the Court had ruled that Mr. Pavlinic would not continue as counsel. 
Mr. Herrman decided to represent himself. There is no evidence that Mr. Herrman made any 
effort to obtain counsel prior to the June 18, 2001 hearing. The prosecution of this case was 
not significantly affected by reason of Mr. Herrman's difficulties in obtaining counsel during 
the June 18, 2001 to September 25, 2001 time period. Furthermore, based upon the Court's 
findings it is apparent tliat whether or not he had counsel, he had developed a tactic to delay 
the case. This tactic was developed very early in the case and was consistently followed. It 
is, therefore, apparent that, even if he had counsel at all times, he did not intend to prosecute 
his claims. 
6, Mr. Herrman is articulate and intelligent as is evident in his appearances before the 
Court and his written communication with the Court (see exhibit 4 to the October 31, 2002 
hearing as an example). Instead of responding to the three Order to Show Cause hearings by 
proceeding on this case, he has successfully delayed this case. He has been successful in 
delaying this case until after the Board considered his parole. After all of this time he now 
expects to avoid the consequences of his decisions. It is the Court's view, based upon all of 
the evidence, that the facts support the conclusion that this case be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute and it is so ordered. Based upon the record, no injustice will result if this matter is 
dismissed. The three Order to Show Cause hearings put Mr. Herrman on notice that the Court 
expected that this case would proceed. Mr. Herrman had an adequate opportunity to prosecute 
this matter. After having received specific direction by the Court on June 18, 2001 Mr. 
Herrman has taken no action to prosecute this case. His only action was to retain Mr. Skordas 
as his attorney. However, in spite of the Court's Order to proceed, he limited Mr. Skordas' 
involvement in the case to keeping the case from being dismissed and never allowed Mr. 
Skordas to prosecute the issues raised in the Writ. 
7. In coming to its conclusion as expressed above, the Court has considered the 
following: (1) The conduct of the parties; (2) The opportunity each party has had to move the 
case forward; (3) What each party has done to move the case forward; (4) what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and (5) Whether injustice may result from 
dismissal. (Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Lanser. Inc.. 544 P2d 876/Utah 1975). 
I believe the findings and conclusions adequately address these issues. 
The Court is satisfied with the above as a final Judgment in this matter. Therefore, this 
Order shall be final upon entry in the Court's records. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 2003. 
BY THE COURTX 
A. LYNNTAWE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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RULE 65C. POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post- conviction relief filed under Utah Code 
Ann. 78-35a-101 et seq., Post- Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms 
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the 
wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the 
legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may 
not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in 
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been 
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the 
results of the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other 
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the 
results of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence 
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
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(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the 
petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post- conviction or other civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities 
in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the 
petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in 
the normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the 
court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on 
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been 
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings 
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings 
of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and 
attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post- conviction petition in a case where the 
petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should 
not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct 
the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition 
is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after 
service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, 
the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and 
shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus 
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner 
may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered 
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by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise 
dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to 
delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary 
hearing. 
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the 
petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or 
video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not 
otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility 
where the petitioner is confined. 
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a 
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with 
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the 
respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; Stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed 
for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the 
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay 
of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and 
the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it 
deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity 
that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 
and Sections 21-7-3 through 21-7- 4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine 
the amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.] 
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Committee Note 
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or 
sentence, regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, 
or a sentence other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are governed by 
paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two 
significant changes from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court to assign 
post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows 
the court to dismiss frivolous claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision is patterned 
after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee adopted the summary procedures 
set forth as a means of balancing the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public's 
interest in the efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post- conviction relief cases. 
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence 
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used determining 
motions for discovery. 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 65C 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-35a-101. Short title. 




78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for 
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal reme-
dies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsec-
tion (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of 
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
199$ 
78-35a-103. Applicability — Effect on petitions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 
78-35a-107, this chapter applies only to post-conviction pro-
ceedings filed on or after July 1,1996. i99« 
78-35a-104. Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a 
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal 
offense may file an action in the district court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or 
Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
78-35a-105 JUDICIAL CODE 696 
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was 
prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, 
or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that re-
quires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, 
because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel 
knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing 
or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, 
and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative 
of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeach-
ment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly 
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the peti-
tioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence 
received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the 
benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme 
Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after 
the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by 
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 1996 
78-35a-105. Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle 
the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of 
pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, 
but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden 
to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1996 
78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception* 
( D A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon 
any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial 
motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for 
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in 
Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be 
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been 
but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 1996 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction 
relief. 
( D A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues 
on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the 
final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court 
which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari 
in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of 
certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for 
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have 
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of eviden-
tiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a 
court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time 
limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limi-
tations period established in this section. 1996 
78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief — Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it 
shall either: 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order 
a new trial or sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the 
order shall be stayed for five days. Within the stay period, 
the respondent shall give written notice to the court and 
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial 
or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives 
notice at any time during the stay period that it intends to 
take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the 
order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry 
or resentence the petitioner, the trial court may order any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentenc-
ing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary. 1996 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dis-
missed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent 
petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel who 
represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may 
not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations 
that will require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of 
law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for 
proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section 
was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent 
post-conviction petition. l**6 
78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment 
on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
1996 
PART 2 
CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
78-35a-201. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days. 
A post-conviction remedy may not be applied for or enter-
tained by any court within 30 days prior to the date set for 
execution of a capital sentence, unless the grounds for appH" 
cation are based on facts or circumstances which developed of 
first became known within that period of time. 1991 
78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel i» 
death penalty cases. 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose 
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RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. 
(1) By Plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action 
may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by 
the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or 
of any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(2) By Order of Court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based 
either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against 
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. 
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, 
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the 
dismissal of any counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone 
pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if 
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there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court 
commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such 
order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the 
proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to Adverse Party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy 
has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon 
be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.] 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 41 
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In The Eighth District Court Of Duchesne County 
Duchesne Department, State of Utah 
THOMAS P. HEERMAN, 
Plaintiff, RULING 
vs. 
CASE NO. 990800051 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. Judge A. Lynn Payne 
The Court has received and reviewed the Petitioners Petition for Relief Under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. The Petition alleges two ground for relief. 
"Ground One" indicates that Petitioner believed that when he entered his plea of guilty 
he would be "afforded all benefits which were associated with maintaining my innocense". He 
then indicates that after beginning his sentence at the prison, prison officials have treated his 
"Alford" Plea the same as a guilty plea. After review of the allegations, the court finds that 
this allegation is frivolous and does not support a claim for relief as a matter of law. 
Petitioners subjective belief as to how the plea would be viewed by third parties (i.e. the Board 
of Pardons) in the future does not provide a basis to set aside the plea. With respect to this 
issue, there is no allegation that he was not adequately advised by the court or counsel. Utah 
Code Annotated 77-13-1 designates all authorized pleas to an information as : (1) Not Guilty; 
(2) Guilty; (3) No Contest; (4) Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity; and (5) Guilty and Mentally 
111. It therefore appears that an "Alford" Plea is a plea of Guilty, and the Board may treat it as 
such. Further, the Petitioner has not presented an arguable factual basis as to how a person 
who plead guilty could reasonably expect to be treated as a person who has maintained his 
innocense. 
"Ground Two" alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. The allegations of ground two 
are not frivolous on their face. Therefore, the clerk is directed to serve a copy of the petition 
and attachments by mail upon the Utah Attorney Generals Office as required by Rules of Civil 
Procedure 65C(h). 
Dated this 13th day of July, 1999. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: fiff^ 
Lyng&ffipfecj at judge's direction 
District-^rt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Thomas P. Heerman 
vs. 
State of Utah 
Case No. 990800051 
(Reference Criminal No. 971800043 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling and Petition for 
Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, by depositing the same in the United States 
Post Office at Duchesne, postage prepaid, to the following parties, as directed by the Court: 
Office of the Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Kristine M. Rogers 
10 West 100 South, Suite 605 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
by Hand 
Dated this 13 day of July, 1999. 
Pat Mullins, Deputy Court Clerk 
T
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Addendum F 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7931 Tommy Lane 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 375-9392 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
DEC 1 9 2002 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE 




STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
& ORDER VACATING DISMISSAL 
Case No. 990800051 RN 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
Respondent. 
The above matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Order of 
Dismissal on October 31, 2002, with the Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Eighth District Court, 
presiding. Mitchell R. Barker appeared and presented evidence and argument on behalf of 
Petitioner Thomas Heerman. Mr. Heerman also appeared. Erin Riley appeared and 
presented evidence and argument on behalf of Respondent The State of Utah. 
The Court heard testimony and received and considered various documentary exhibits. 
Having considered the filings of the parties, the evidence received and the arguments of 
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respective counsel, and having made oral jSndings and conclusions from the Bench, and good 
cause appearing, the Court now enters its 
FINDINGS OF EACT 
i. There was a telephonic hearing held on April 22> 2002; Petitioner was and is in 
the Utah State Prison system, and was not transported for the hearing. Erin Riley appeared 
by telephone for the State of Utah, and an associate of Mr. Skordas appeared by telephone 
as well. At that hearing, the associate told the Court that Mr. Skordas did not object to 
dismissal, as he understood that petitioner wished to proceed in some other way. 
2. The Court finds that the more credible testimony is to the effect that petitioner 
discussed dismissal with his attorney, Gregory Skordas. 
3. It is reasonable to assume that petitioner knew or believed that disposition or 
pendency of this habeas corpus oase might affect the result obtained from the Board of 
Pardons. 
4. The Court believes that petitioner consented ta or requested that Mr. Skordas 
allow this case to be dismissed. 
5. However, based on the information available to him, petitioner thought that if 
dismissal was permitted, he could re-file the case within one year. 
6. Thq Court finds, that Mr. Skordas did not explain to petitioner the effect which 
dismissal of this case on an Order to Show Cause would have on him. For example, 
petitioner was not warned of the authority to the effect that dismissal on an Order to Show 
Cause does not qualify for a re-filing, even if accomplished within one year of dismissal. 
Heerman v. St. Findings, Conclusions and Order 2 
prosecute up until the dismissal datei of April 22,2002. 
GRPER 
The Court having_entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
good cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows; 
L The April 22^  2002 dismissal is vacated and set aside. 
2; Petitioner is ordered to appear before this Court on January 13, 2002, to show 
cause why this habeas corpus action should not be dismissed for any failures to prosecute 
prior to April 22, 2002. 
3. Petitioner Heerman shall be transported to the Court on that date, no later than 
1:30 p.m. The hearing date and time are subject to change by the Court. 
SO FOUND, CONCLUDED AND ORDERED ON this ^/£ day of 
A c 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable MLynne Payne 
District Judge 
Heerman VL St FinHinn* r>* 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Failures to prosecute (or lack of them) before the telephonic conference of April 
11,2002 are not relevant to this Motion to Vacate, since vacation was ostensibly by consent 
of petitioner's attorney, Mr. Skordas. 
2. When proper notice is given of a show cause hearing on failure to prosecute, and 
the party against whom dismissal is proposed fails to appear, the result is usually that the 
Court will dismiss the case. 
3. If the party ordered to show cause does appear, it is his burden to show and 
explain good cause why dismissal should not occur. 
4. The Court concludes that petitioner's attorney did not explain to him that 
dismissal could be permanent. 
5. The Court concludes that petitioner's belief that he could re-file was a material 
misunderstanding of the effect of dismissal. 
6. The Court concludes that Petitioner did not knowingly allow the case to be 
dismissed. 
7. A writ of habeas corpus is an important right, giving a prisoner the opportunity 
to test the legality of his incarceration. Petitioner's right to a determination on the merits 
should not be denied under the circumstances, purely based on his attorney consenting to 
dismissal, since this was not an informed waiver of a known right on the part of petitioner. 
8. While the Court will set aside the dismissal, the Petitioner should be required to 
appear and show cause why the matter should not in fact be dismissed for any failure(s) to 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiiVthat-oa-the- ^ J y day of November^  2002, I-caused a true and correct copy^of the 
foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following individual at the indicated address: 
Erin Riley, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.0854 
is-
Mitchell R. Barker 
H^BfnUnl-y^^t^if^i^^^-^^^^^^9^^^*^ ****** t\**U*» C 
Addendum G 
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COPY 
Kristine M. Rogers #6978 
Thomas A- Pavlinic, Pro Hoc Vim 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Judge Building 
8 East Broadway, Suite 712 
Salt Lake G<y,UT 34111 
(801) 994-6000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
THOMAS P. HEERMAN * Joint Supination Suspending Future 
Proceedings 
Petitioner * 
* CMNumber: 99-0800051 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Respondent * Judge; A Lynn Payne 
JOINT STIPULATION SUSPENDING FUTURE PROCEEDINGS 
Thomas P. Heerman, Petitioner, by and through Kristine M. Rogers and 
Thomas A. Pavlinic, his attorneys, and the State of Utah, by and through Assistant 
Attorney General Erin Riley, hereby stipulate as f ollows: 
1. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the State of Utah have agreed 
to suspend future proceedings in this case until Mr. Heerman has had an opportunity 
to have his hearing before the Board of Pardons. 
2. Both counsel for Mr. Heerman have discussed this decision mth him 
and have obtained his consent. 
3. Mr. Heerman, -will be happy to provide, as a separate exhibit, his -written 
09/29/00 FRI 18:01 FAX 410 266 9710 inomas A. rav±inic 
consent to suspend future proceedings in this case until after he has had an 
opportunity- of having his case reviewed by the Board of Pardons, 
4« Counsel for the parties have no objection to the court passing any 
appropriate order which suspends all future proceedings until Mr. Heerman has had 
an opportunity to have his case .reviewed by the Board of Pardons, 
DATED t h i s 5th day of September, 2000. 
A 
Krisrine M Rogers #6978 
Judge Building 
8 East Broadway, Suite 712 
Salt Lake City, ITT 84111 
(801) 994-6000 
Thomas A. Pavlinic, PtoHac Vice 
TheConte Building 
116 Defense Hjgfrwav, Suite 502 
Annapolis, MD 21401-7063 
(410) 974-6560 
Erin Riley, Esquire 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake Giiy, UT 84114-0854 
(801)366-0110 
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